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ABSTRACT: Motivated by symbolic ideology research and Social Identity Theory, this article introduces an
original measure of ideological social identity (ISI) designed to capture feelings of psychological attachment to an
ideological in-group and facilitate analysis of their attitudinal and behavioral effects. Data from a nationally
representative sample of survey experiment participants indicates that the ISI scale is empirically distinct from
ideological self-placement, the standard measure of symbolic ideology, and it conditions the effects of selfplacement on vote choice in actual and hypothetical election scenarios. Ideological social identity is also common
within the American public, particularly among conservatives, and responsive to environmental stimuli that make
ideology salient including electoral competition and “new media” news sources. In addition to its immediate
contributions, this research represents a necessary first step toward more fully exploiting the profound theoretical
and empirical implications of Social Identity Theory in studies of ideological identification.
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Traditional conceptualizations of ideology’s political functions – according to which individuals should
derive their political preferences from internally elaborated “belief systems” (see Converse 1964) and engage in
spatial comparisons to make electoral decisions (Downs 1957) – assume a sophisticated understanding of
ideological abstractions that is, for the most part, not characteristic of the American public (Campbell, Converse,
Miller, and Stokes 1960; Converse 1964; Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, and Weisberg 2008; but see Achen 1975;
Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976). Kinder (1983, p. 416) summarizes: “the political thinking of much of the public
cannot be adequately described as ideological in the sense of deductive reasoning from an overarching set of
integrated principles about politics and the social world.”
Nonetheless, ideology remains empirically relevant, even essential, to understanding political behavior.
Ideology is one of the most consistent and powerful predictors of myriad political attitudes and behaviors, including
vote choice (Jost 2006; Levitin and Miller 1979; Luttbeg and Gant 1985), candidate evaluations (Zaller 1992),
policy preferences (Feldman 2003; Jacoby 1991), and party identification (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998;
Levendusky 2009).
For over a half-century, scholars faced with this apparent disconnect have struggled to characterize
ideology’s impact on political attitudes and behavior. One of the most significant efforts to advance this debate
comes from a line of research that reconceptualizes ideological identification as a symbolic attachment to
ideological groups not dependent upon, or even necessarily related to, an individual policy orientation. Primary
evidence of “symbolic ideology” is found in studies of the “symbolic-operational paradox,” which examine
Americans’ longstanding and overwhelming preference for conservative self-identification in spite of an aggregate
preference for liberal policies (Ellis and Stimson 2012; Free and Cantril 1967). A similar pattern holds at the
individual level; symbolic ideology (ideological self-identification) and operational ideology (policy preferences)
are modestly correlated, “suggesting that they are, in fact, different concepts and should be analyzed separately”
(Popp and Rudolph 2011, Footnote 5).
Symbolic ideology scholars primarily attribute ideological identification to the influence of social groups
and messages. One of the best predictors of ideological self-identification is an individual’s evaluation of
ideological groups, and those evaluations largely are based upon attitudes toward the social groups and symbols with
which an ideological label is most closely associated, e.g. businessmen and the military for conservatives and
feminists and ethnic minorities for liberals (Conover and Feldman 1981). In fact, studies indicate that conservative
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self-identification is primarily a reaction against liberalism and its associated social groups while hostility toward
conservative groups has become an increasingly powerful predictor of liberal self-identification in recent years
(Zschirnt 2011). Social influences figure prominently in scholars’ explanations of the symbolic-operational
paradox, as well. Ellis and Stimson (2012) find that Americans’ overwhelming preference for conservative selfidentification is due in large part to extra-political cultural connotations and patterns of elite discourse that favor the
conservative label and disfavor the liberal label. Symbolic attachments are also shown to significantly influence
expressed policy preferences, but their effects are contingent upon social cues from ideological group members;
absent in-group cues, the relationship between ideological self-identification and policy preference is much weaker
or not statistically significant (Malka and Lelkes 2010; Popp and Rudolph 2011).
Symbolic ideology research helps to clarify the apparent contradiction between evidence showing that the
American public is lacking in ideological sophistication yet influenced in its political attitudes and behaviors by
ideological identification. Contrary to the traditional conceptualization of ideology as, in its meaningful form, an
internal application of abstract principles (see Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964), symbolic ideology embraces
the notion that ideology derives much of its explanatory power from the influence of social factors giving meaning
to ideological labels and direction to ideological group members. In short, it is an interaction of internal
categorization and external cues that makes ideology relevant to the political behavior of the mass public.
Moreover, symbolic ideology does not require a high level of political sophistication; attitudes toward, and
applications of, ideological labels primarily are based upon symbolic evaluations, not elaborated policy
orientations.1
The achievements of symbolic ideology research recommend further theoretical and empirical
development. A promising opportunity for such development, for reasons that I elaborate upon below, is found in
Social Identity Theory (SIT). SIT is one of the most influential theories in the social sciences and in recent years it

1

The symbolic ideology approach, while influential, is hardly universal among scholars; critics argue that

ideological identifications are primarily based upon substantive policy views rather than symbolic evaluations (see,
for example, Abramowitz and Saunders 2006). The present analysis is not designed to demonstrate the superiority
of either approach, but to refine scholars’ understanding of symbolic ideology with the view that it, as well as
operational ideology, has significant theoretical and empirical value.
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has assumed greater prominence in the political science literature, motivating studies of subjects as diverse as
judicial behavior (Baum 2006), political intolerance (Gibson and Gouws 2000), political participation (Fowler and
Kam 2007), national identity and patriotism (Althaus and Coe 2011; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Theiss-Morse 2009),
and party identification (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2005; Greene 1999; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012;
Weisberg and Hasecke 1999). By emphasizing the attitudinal and behavioral significance of internalized social
group membership and external social group cues, SIT maps clearly onto the symbolic ideology literature’s
reconceptualization of ideological identification. At the same time, the SIT literature includes many theoretical and
empirical innovations relevant to understanding symbolic ideology, and ideology more generally, but never applied
toward that end. In fact, no study in the symbolic ideology literature or elsewhere has directly measured and
analyzed ideological identification as a social identity.
The purpose of this analysis is to establish a measure of ideological social identity (ISI), or psychological
attachment to an ideological in-group, and use it to answer fundamental questions including: How common is ISI
within the American public? Who is most, or least, likely to have a strong ISI? Does ISI vary across environmental
contexts, and if so how? Is ISI relevant to understanding political behavior, particularly in relation to the influence
of ideological identification? The value of such an analysis is twofold: first, evidence of meaningful and
consequential ideological social identity will further validate symbolic ideology research while also extending it
theoretically and empirically; second, establishing the reality of ideological social identity in the mass public is a
necessary first step toward more fully exploiting the theoretical and empirical insights of the SIT literature in future
studies of ideological identification, as detailed below.
Data for this analysis come from an original survey experiment conducted among a nationally
representative participant sample. Included in the survey experiment are direct measures of ideological social
identity, as well as measures of relevant demographic and political characteristics, vote choice measures, and
experimental manipulations designed to capture variation in ISI levels across different electoral contexts. I use these
data to test a series of hypotheses addressing the prevalence, causes, and behavioral significance of ideological
social identity. The results of this analysis indicate that ISI is an empirically distinct component of ideological
identification that is prevalent in the mass public and subject to variation, with respect to strength and underlying
causes, across ideological groups and electoral contexts. Also, it is behaviorally consequential; ISI conditions the
effect of ideological self-placement on vote choice in actual and hypothetical elections.
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Theory
Henri Tajfel and colleagues developed Social Identity Theory in order to better understand the nature and
causes of inter-group relations. Through a series of experimental studies, they demonstrated that mere
categorization within a social group, once internalized, induces high levels of in-group identification, inter-group
differentiation, and in-group bias – even if the group is an arbitrary one and participants have no basis for perceiving
common in-group interests (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Tajfel, Flament, Billig, and Bundy 1971; see also Allen and
Wilder 1975; Brewer and Silver 1978; Doise and Sinclair 1973). Experimental participants, in effect, were adopting
a social identity, defined by Tajfel (1978, 63) as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his
knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance
attached to that membership.”
Foundational to SIT are two assumptions: first, individuals define themselves in large part by the groups to
which they belong; second, individuals strive for positive self-evaluation and enhanced self-esteem (Tajfel et al.
1971; see also Brewer 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell 1987). In order to positively evaluate
oneself, then, individuals must also positively evaluate the in-group that in part defines the self. Thus, social
identity will motivate an individual toward attitudes and behaviors that promote the in-group, perhaps but not
necessarily at the expense of the out-group (Brewer 2002), and maintain in-group membership through compliance
with in-group norms. In essence, social identity represents a process of depersonalization, “whereby people come to
perceive themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities”
(Roccas and Brewer 2002, 50).
SIT has significant implications for understanding ideological identification. Typically, about half of all
survey respondents identify themselves as liberals or conservatives, and two-thirds identify as moderates, liberals, or
conservatives. To the extent that those identities are internalized, as suggested by respondents’ willingness to selfcategorize, SIT research indicates that ideological group members will be psychologically motivated to positively
evaluate the in-group, maintain in-group norms, and advance in-group interests.2 Opportunities for ideological
social identity to influence political attitudes and behaviors are numerous and profound.

2

This explanation is not contingent upon a belief in the symbolic ideology view, contested by operational ideology

advocates, that ideological identification is primarily based upon evaluations of social groups associated with
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Take, for example, a party primary or general election in which a candidate is perceived to be at odds with
an intra-party ideological faction: members of the opposing ideological in-group may be less willing to support that
candidate – through voting, financial contributions, volunteering, or persuasion of other voters – for fear of
weakening the ideological in-group, in the event that the out-group candidate succeeds, and in turn suffering
negative personal consequences. One could imagine this explanation applying to conservative and Tea Party voters
in the Republican Party primaries and presidential elections of 2008, 2010, and 2012. Or consider a policy debate in
which party leaders promote a policy that conflicts with the views of a dominant intra-party ideological faction, such
as Bill Clinton’s support for welfare reform in the 1990s or George W. Bush’s support for immigration reform in the
2000s. To the extent that prominent ideological in-group members, such as radio talk show hosts and interest group
leaders, voice opposition, individuals might be motivated by ideological social identity to oppose party leaders in
order to increase the ideological in-group’s chances of successful opposition or at least avoid violating in-group
norms and destabilizing their self-concept.
The symbolic ideology literature provides some basis for expecting such effects. Among other examples,
Popp and Rudolph (2011) and Malka and Lelkes (2010) show that ideological group cues significantly influence
individual policy judgments. Analyzing ideological identification within the framework of Social Identity Theory
would add theoretical weight to such findings while also opening up new opportunities for theoretical and empirical

ideological labels (Conover and Feldman 1981; Zschirnt 2011; for a critical analysis, see Abramowitz and Saunders
2006), although that is a view with which I generally agree. Self-categorization, or internalization of a group
identity, is sufficient to trigger the social identity processes described above; whether an individual arrives at the
point of ideological identification based on symbolic evaluations or policy preferences should not be determinative,
only the fact of self-categorization. Social identity and its attendant processes are evident among a wide range of
groups, after all, from those based on arbitrary assignment (see, for example, Tajfel et al. 1971) to those seemingly
based on social and political convictions, such as feminism (Huddy 1997). Once an individual develops an
ideological social identity, however, the ideological in-group becomes a source of psychological and affective
attachment motivating political behavior based on group considerations rather, or at least more so, than independent
policy judgments. In this sense, the ideological in-group takes on a symbolic function regardless of whether it was
adopted for symbolic or substantive reasons.
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extension. For instance, the effects of such cues might be stronger among individuals with a high level of
ideological social identity, since in-group membership is a more central part of their self-concept, or conversely
among more moderate members of an ideological group who are amenable to compromise on policy grounds but
sensitive to the risk of violating in-group norms and destabilizing their self-concept. Social identity could also help
to explain how individuals respond when ideological in-group cues conflict with partisan in-group cues; individuals
with a stronger ideological social identity, relative to partisan social identity, may be more likely to accept the
ideological in-group cue, and vice versa.
Also, it is important to note that the symbolic ideology literature typically uses ideological self-placement
to measure its central concept. The self-placement scale, however, does not directly measure the in-group
attachments with which symbolic ideology scholars are concerned; while it does reveal the ideological group within
which an individual self-categorizes, its most explicit function is to measure ideological extremity, e.g. “slightly
liberal” versus “liberal” versus “very liberal”. To isolate the depth and specific effects of in-group attachment
requires a more sensitive measure explicitly designed toward that end. The SIT literature provides such empirical
measures that can be easily adapted to capture ideological in-group attachment, as detailed below. Moreover,
interacting the self-placement and ideological social identity measures, as I do in this analysis, enables scholars to
gauge the behavioral impact of ideological in-group attachments across levels of self-reported ideological extremity.
The symbolic ideology literature itself attests to the relevance of Social Identity Theory. Ellis and Stimson
(2012) title Section 6.3 of Ideology in America “Another Explanation, Part 2: ‘Conservatism’ As Social Identity.”
However, the authors do not situate their analysis within the SIT literature and they operationalize social identity
using child-rearing values that are most commonly associated with authoritarianism (see Hetherington and Weiler
2009). Malka and Lelkes (2010, 160), on the other hand, draw heavily upon the SIT literature in their description of
ideology’s effects, explaining at one point that “A self-categorization as ‘conservative’… will constitute a social
identity when one’s self-perception as conservative is experienced as a point of similarity with other ingroup
members and as a point of collective difference with outgroup members.” However, Malka and Lelkes make no
direct use of social identity measures, instead operationalizing ideological identification as self-placement. In short,
the concept of ideological social identity is not new to the symbolic ideology literature but it is quite
underdeveloped. I aim to develop the concept through direct measurement and analysis of ideological social
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identity, and in doing so to provide a valuable theoretical and empirical extension of the symbolic ideology literature
amenable to advancement through future research.

Hypotheses
The first objective of this analysis is to establish a valid measure of ideological social identity. The
traditional measure of ideological identification, used throughout the symbolic ideology literature and the political
science literature more broadly, is the self-placement scale that typically asks respondents to place themselves on a
seven-point ideological continuum ranging from very liberal to very conservative. The self-placement scale is
explicitly designed to measure ideological extremity, which is qualitatively different from feelings of psychological
attachment to an ideological in-group. Indeed, there is no basis in the SIT literature for expecting ideological social
identity to be exclusive to extreme ideologues; self-categorization alone is sufficient to produce social identity and
its attendant effects (Tajfel et al. 1971). Of course, it does stand to reason that ideological extremists will tend to
feel more passionately about politics and thus find political in-groups more relevant to self-definition. Given these
considerations, I expect self-placement and ISI measures to be empirically related but also clearly distinguishable;
specifically, I hypothesize a statistically significant but modest correlation between the two scales.
The next objective of this analysis is to estimate the prevalence of ideological social identity in the mass
public. I hypothesize that a substantial proportion of ideological identifiers will score at least moderately on the ISI
scale and that their mean ISI score will exceed the scale’s median value, given the SIT literature’s finding that selfcategorization within a social group is sufficient to produce feelings of social identity.
The SIT literature also indicates that the strength of a social identity may vary in response to environmental
stimuli and individual characteristics; in particular, an increase in the contextual salience of a relevant identity group
is positively associated with levels of social identity and inter-group bias (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman,
and Rust 1993; Mullen, Brown, and Smith 1992; Oakes 1987). A number of hypotheses follow from this empirical
finding. First, ISI levels should be higher when individuals are primed to think about electoral competition, and
particularly party primaries in which ideological differences often constitute the major cleavage between candidates.
Second, ISI levels should be highest among self-identified conservatives since elite discourse is characterized by a
disproportionate and generally positive use of the conservative label (Ellis and Stimson 2012). Third, ISI levels
should be higher among individuals who use a great deal of new media sources such as cable news, talk radio, and
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internet blogs, since those sources tend to be more ideological in nature than traditional news sources such as
newspapers, network television news, and local television news. In essence, I assume that each of these factors
increase ideology’s salience to the individual in question, and in turn strengthens ideological social identity.3
Finally, I hypothesize an interaction effect whereby ideological social identity conditions the impact of
ideological self-placement on vote choice; specifically, for individuals with an ideological social identity that is at
least moderate in strength, I expect the effects of self-placement to be statistically significant and to strengthen as ISI
strengthens. The more conventional alternative, of course, would be to test the direct effects of ISI on vote choice.
However, doing so would entail treating self-placement merely as a statistical control. To the contrary, the effects of
these two components of ideological identification are more likely to be complementary than independent; a very
conservative individual with a strong ideological social identity has greater motivation to support a conservative
candidate than a slightly conservative individual with a strong social identity or a very conservative individual with
a weak social identity. In short, ideological social identity should reinforce the effects of ideological self-placement,
and vice versa. This approach is also consistent with my goal of extending, not fundamentally challenging,
symbolic ideology research. Rather than model ISI as an alternative to self-placement, and argue that the former
should supplant the latter, I interact the two measures in hopes of a more constructive result: clarifying the
conditions under which self-placement – the standard measure of symbolic ideology – is empirically relevant to vote
choice, and when its effects are strongest and weakest.

3

Iyengar et al. (2012) adopt a similar approach in their study of partisan affective polarization, explaining: “the

more salient the affiliation, the more biased the individual’s beliefs about in-group and out-group members.
Salience itself can depend on either dispositional factors… or characteristics of the information environment…”
(407-408). Their analysis indicates that campaign environments have the effect of strengthening partisan identities
and confirming partisan stereotypes; in particular, exposure to negative campaign advertisements is a statistically
significant and positive predictor of affective polarization. Thus, I find in this research direct support for
emphasizing the role of salience in social identity processes, and indirect support for the hypothesized effects of
electoral competition and exposure to more ideologically-biased media sources on ideological social identity.
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Data & Empirical Methods
Data for this analysis come from an original online survey experiment that was administered by Knowledge
Networks (KN)4 and funded with financial support from Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences
(TESS).5 KN selected 1,666 potential participants from its ongoing Knowledge Panel for e-mail solicitation in April
2010, 66% of whom completed the survey experiment for a total sample of 1,089 participants. 6
The survey experiment included three experimental manipulations following a 3 (election condition) x 2
(social identity question order) 7 x 2 (candidate presentation order)8, between-groups factorial design. Participants
were randomly assigned to each condition. The first manipulation was designed to test variation in ideological
social identity levels across electoral contexts, and to measure vote choice in a controlled information environment.
For this manipulation, treatment group participants read an experimental stimulus, provided in this article’s

4

Knowledge Networks uses random-digit dial and address-based sampling methods to recruit a representative group

of Americans into its Knowledge Panel. KN also provides Internet access and hardware, including computers, when
needed in order to facilitate representative sampling.
5

TESS uses funds from a National Science Foundation grant (SES-0818839) to provide financial support for

scholars to conduct online survey experiments among nationally representative participant samples. For more
information, see www.tessexperiments.org.
6

Knowledge Networks included a post-stratification weight in the deliverable data to correct for demographic

unrepresentativeness. I use this weight in my analysis when appropriate.
7

I included this manipulation to test whether social identity levels varied depending on the order in which

participants completed ISI versus PSI items. One-way ANOVAs show no such effect. I exclude this manipulation
from further analysis.
8

This manipulation randomly varied the order in which participants read about party candidates in the general

election condition or ideological candidates in the party primary conditions. There is no reason to expect that
candidate order influences reported social identity levels. It could, however, affect vote choice and so I include it in
the experimental election vote choice model.
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appendix, describing a hypothetical general election or party primary for a U.S. Senate seat. 9 The general election
(party primary) stimulus characterized the two candidates in terms of their partisan affiliations (ideological
reputations), major campaign themes, and the implications of each candidate’s victory for the partisan (ideological)
direction of the country (party). Immediately after reading the stimulus, treatment group participants were asked to
report the candidate for whom they would vote in the election. Control group participants read no election stimulus
and so they were not presented with a hypothetical vote choice question.
To measure ideological social identity in this survey, I adapted Mael and Tetrick’s (1992) Identification
with a Psychological Group (IDPG) scale. The IDPG is an empirically robust and demonstrably valid measure of
social identity (see Brewer and Silver 2000) utilized often in the social science literatures and in many previous
studies of partisan social identity (see Green et al. 2005; Greene 1999; Weisberg and Hasecke 1999). The full IDPG
scale consists of ten statements with which participants state their level of agreement on a seven-point scale ranging
from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” Space and cost constraints necessitated including a three-item
IDPG subset in the survey experiment,10 consisting of the following statements: “When someone praises (this
group), it feels to me like a personal compliment”; “(This group’s) successes are my successes”; “If a prominent
(member of this group) got caught in a scandal, I would not feel embarrassed at all” (reversed). I inserted partisan
labels (Republicans/Democrats/Independents) in the parentheses when measuring partisan social identity and
ideological labels (political conservatives/ political liberals/ political moderates) when measuring ideological social
identity.11

9

Participants in the latter condition were assigned to party primaries based on reported party affiliation in the KN

profile data: Republican (Democratic) identifiers read about a Republican (Democratic) primary and Independents
were randomly assigned to either party’s primary.
10

Green et al. (2005) use a three-item subset of the IDPG scale, and Weisberg and Hasecke (1999) four items, to

study partisan social identity. Both scales prove to be valid and reliable.
11

Participants completed one set of PSI measures and one set of ISI measures, corresponding to their partisan and

ideological affiliations as previously reported in the KN profile data.
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The social identity scales used in this analysis consist of the “compliment” and “success” items only. I
exclude the “scandal” item from analysis due to its poor reliability. 12 The two-item scale proves to be a reliable
measure of social identity for all partisan and ideological groups, with Cronbach’s Alpha estimates of 0.78 for
conservatives, moderates, and Republicans; 0.77 for Democrats; 0.75 for liberals; and 0.67 for Independents.13 To
create ISI and PSI scores, I coded each participant’s response to the relevant “success” and “praise” items as ranging
from one (weakest social identity) to seven (strongest social identity) and then calculated participants’ average
scores on the two scales.
I test the hypothesized causes of variation in ideological social identity levels using a linear regression
model. The key independent variables in this model represent assignment to the general election treatment group,
coded one if treated and zero otherwise; assignment to the party primary treatment group, coded one if treated and
zero otherwise;14 and self-reported weekly exposure to six different types of news sources, including network
television news, local television news, cable television news, newspapers, radio news, and blogs, each coded from
zero (never) to four (three times a week or more). Additional independent variables include: a folded ideological
self-placement scale, coded from zero (moderate) to three (very liberal/conservative); a folded party identification
scale, coded from zero (independent) to three (strong Democrat/Republican); age, coded continuously; education,
coded from one (eighth grade education) to eleven (professional or doctoral degree); religious attendance, coded
from zero (never) to five (more than once a week); annual household income, coded from zero (less than $5,000) to
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Cronbach’s Alpha estimates range between 0.02 and 0.48 when pairing the scandal item with either of the other

two items, well below acceptable reliability standards.
13

As an additional check on the performance of the two-item scale, I used data from a related study of 2008 national

party convention delegates that included five social identity measures: the three already described plus two
additional measures adapted from the IDPG. The compliment-success scale performs exceptionally well in this
analysis. As a measure of liberal, conservative, and Democratic – but not Republican – social identity, this scale
performs far better than any other two-item scale combination, and better than expanded scales including all five
items or four after excluding the scandal item.
14

Control group participants constitute the baseline category in this analysis, since they are coded zero for both of

the electoral condition dummy variables.
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eighteen ($175,000 or more); gender, coded one for female and zero for male; race, coded one for white and zero for
non-white.
Next, I test the hypothesized interaction effect of ideological social identity and ideological self-placement
on vote choice, using two logistic regression models. The first model predicts vote choice in the hypothetical Senate
general election, for participants in that treatment group only. The second model predicts vote choice in the 2008
presidential election for all participants, using information previously reported in the Knowledge Panel profile data.
Votes for a Democratic candidate are coded one and votes for a Republican candidate are coded zero.
The key independent variables in these models are ideological self-placement, ideological social identity,
and the interaction of both scales. The self-placement scale is coded to range from one (very liberal) to seven (very
conservative). The ISI scale is coded to range from one (weakest social identity) to seven (strongest social
identity). The interaction term multiplies a participant’s score on both of these scales. Additional independent
variables include: party identification, ranging from one (Strong Democrat) to seven (Strong Republican); a partisan
social identity scale, constructed in the same manner as the ISI scale; age, gender, race, education, religious
attendance, and income variables coded as described above. Finally, to control for potential order effects, I include
a variable in the hypothetical Senate election model representing the order in which participants read about the
candidates, coded one if the Republican candidate preceded the Democratic candidate and zero if the Democratic
candidate preceded the Republican candidate.

Results
As hypothesized, the correlation between ISI and self-placement is statistically significant but modest in
magnitude, at 0.283. Disaggregating by ideological groups reveals a somewhat higher correlation for conservatives
(0.322) than for liberals (0.232), but no substantive differences from the overall finding. The correlation between
scales is too low for them to be measuring the same concept, unless perhaps a high level of measurement error is
disguising their redundancy. If, however, one or both measures were contaminated by a great deal of error, one
would expect to find a less consistent and predictable relationship than is evident: comparing across the ideological
self-placement scale, the mean ISI score is highest for very liberal/conservative participants (4.82), followed by
liberal/conservative participants (4.60), followed by slightly liberal/conservative participants (3.88). The same
pattern holds when analyzing liberals and conservatives, separately. In other words, ideological extremity on one
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measure tracks ideological extremity on the other measure – an indication of construct validity, I would argue. The
relationship between the two scales is perfectly consistent with the argument that they tap distinct dimensions of the
same underlying concept (ideological identification): ideological self-placement and ideological social identity vary
systematically, and in a predictable pattern, while correlating only modestly.
Next, I use the data from my nationally representative participant sample to estimate ISI levels in the mass
public. The kernel density plot in Figure 1 shows that a sizable proportion of ideological identifiers, in general, have
what could be reasonably characterized as an ideological social identity. In the aggregate, 41.5% of participants
score above the ISI scale’s neutral point (“neither agree nor disagree”) and nearly 29% at least slightly agree with
the ISI statements, on average. More concretely, a t-test reveals that the mean ISI score for all participants (M =
4.21, SD = 1.20) is significantly higher than the scale’s neutral point of four, t(1079) = 5.68, p = 0.000. Thus, on
average, participants exhibit at least a moderate degree of ideological social identity. 15
[Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 also plots separate ISI scores for liberals, conservatives, and moderates. The data provide initial
support for the hypothesis that conservatives have stronger ideological social identities, on average, than liberals and
moderates. A majority of conservatives score above the ISI scale’s neutral point and 40% of conservatives at least
slightly agree with the ISI statements, on average, in both cases exceeding liberal and moderate performance.

15

Ideological social identity, it should be noted, proves not to be a proxy for partisan social identity. Although the

two variables are highly correlated, at 0.619, this correlation is almost identical to that of the traditional ideological
and partisan self-placement measures, at 0.603. Moreover, a majority of participants have distinct scores on the ISI
and PSI scales, with more than a quarter (27.4%) exhibiting a stronger ideological than partisan social identity. In
fact, participants identifying as conservatives and Republicans score significantly higher in terms of ideological
social identity (M = 4.62, SD = 1.20) than they do in terms of partisan social identity (M = 4.40, SD = 1.15), t(350) =
4.19, p = 0.000, while moderate Independents score significantly higher on PSI (M = 4.10, SD = 1.04) than on ISI
(M = 3.60, SD = 1.01), t(48) = -3.54, p = 0.001. Also, liberal Democrats have a higher PSI (M = 4.46, SD = 1.22)
than ISI, but this difference reaches only marginal levels of statistical significance (M = 4.33, SD = 1.22) t(211) = 1.83, p = 0.070. Thus, while ideological and partisan social identities are empirically related, they do represent
distinct constructs and warrant distinct analysis here as well as within the political science literature at large.

15

According to one-way ANOVAs, conservatives (M = 4.44, SD = 1.25) do, in fact, score significantly higher than
moderates on the ISI scale (M = 3.91, SD = 1.07), F (1, 826) = 42.67, p = 0.000. However, the difference between
conservative and liberal (M = 4.25, SD = 1.21) scores falls just short of conventional significance levels, F(1, 698) =
3.57, p = 0.059.16 Taken together, this evidence indicates that conservatives typically have somewhat stronger
ideological social identity than liberals but the difference between them is quantitative rather than qualitative; ISI is
common to both liberals and conservatives, with the latter’s advantage being marginally significant.17
Next I test two other hypothesized causes of variation in ideological social identity levels through linear
regression analysis: the salience of electoral competition and exposure to “new media” news sources. Also included
in these models are a series of demographic and political variables relevant to ideological identification and thus
capable of influencing ISI levels. The value of this analysis, in essence, is to identify who is most likely to have a
strong (or weak) ideological social identity, and when ISI is strongest. To provide general conclusions about the
causes of variation in ISI, first I test this model among all participants. Then, to detect potential differences between
ideological groups, I separately test the same model among conservative, liberal, or moderate participants only.
Table 1 presents the results of the linear regression models, beginning with the full participant sample in
Column 1. The results in Column 1 generally confirm the hypothesized impact of electoral competition and new
media exposure on ISI levels. First, in comparison to the excluded category of control group participants, who read
no experimental stimulus priming thoughts of electoral competition, participants in the general election and party
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Conservatives and liberals’ mean ISI scores exceed the ISI scale’s neutral point of four at the 0.001 significance

level, according to t-tests. Moderates’ mean ISI score does not differ significantly from the neutral point (p =
0.958).
17

While ISI levels are lowest among moderates, some of these respondents do exhibit a strong ideological social

identity: 26.8% of moderates score above the scale’s midpoint, and 15.8% at least slightly agree with the ISI
statements. Given the prevalence of ideological moderates in the mass public, including 35.5% of the survey
experiment sample, moderate social identity could be politically significant. For instance, moderate social identity
may help to empirically explain responses to partisan and ideological polarization such as third-party voting and
ticket-splitting. Future research would be useful in exploring such effects.
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primary treatment groups exhibit statistically significant increases in ideological social identity levels. This finding
is consistent with research in the SIT literature indicating that social identity becomes stronger in response to
environmental stimuli that make the relevant identity more salient. However, contrary to my expectations, the
magnitude of that increase is essentially equal for participants exposed to a general election stimulus, which refers
only to party competition, and participants exposed to a party primary stimulus, which explicitly references
competition between ideological groups. Apparently, electoral competition in general strengthens ideological social
identity, regardless of whether ideological groups are made implicitly or explicitly salient.
[Table 1 here]
New media exposure also predicts increased ideological social identity; the cable television news and
internet blog variables are statistically significant and positively signed in Column 1, while talk radio and each of the
traditional news variables are not significant. This finding is most likely attributable to the ideological nature of
many cable news programs and blogs. Of course, the same can be said about talk radio, which is not a significant
predictor of ISI. Perhaps this discrepancy is due to the diversity of talk radio, which includes not only ideological
news programs but also traditional news programming such as National Public Radio and local news, as well as
numerous sports programs and stations.
Other statistically significant variables in the full sample model include gender, age, and the folded party
identification and ideological self-placement measures. Males and older people exhibit higher levels of ISI. Also,
not surprisingly given the preceding analysis, more partisan and ideological participants exhibit higher levels of ISI.
Ideological self-placement’s effects provide additional insight into the empirical relationship between that variable
and ideological social identity; whereas preceding evidence of the relationship is merely correlational, the results
from Table 1 demonstrate that it is robust to a substantial battery of relevant covariates. Yet, at the same time, the
relationship is hardly determinative, given the size of self-placement’s coefficient (0.260) and the independent
effects of other significant variables in the model. These results further indicate that ideological self-placement and
ideological social identity are empirically related yet distinct constructs.
The variable most notable for not reaching statistical significance is education. Political behavior models
often use education as a proxy for political sophistication (see, for example, Zaller 1992), and it is a common finding
in political science research that political sophisticates understand and utilize ideological concepts more capably
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than non-sophisticates (Jacoby 1991; Knight 1985). Education’s failure to reach statistical significance in this
analysis indicates that ideological social identity is not generally limited to political sophisticates. 18
The second, third, and fourth columns of Table 1 present results from the same empirical model, tested
respectively among conservative, liberal, and moderate identifiers. Comparing across models provides the
opportunity to identify variation in the factors predicting ISI for different ideological groups. Indeed, the
hypothesized effects of electoral competition and new media exposure vary across ideological groups. In terms of
the former, assignment to the general election and party primary conditions is a statistically significant predictor of
increased conservative and moderate social identity. However, neither variable is significant in the liberal social
identity model. The explanation for this discrepant result is unclear, and worthy of future analysis given its
departure from the empirical findings of the SIT literature. The effect among conservatives and moderates,
however, is consistent with expectations and also worthy of further analysis. In particular, the finding that party
primaries strengthen ISI among conservatives and moderates has important implications for scholars’ understanding
of partisan polarization. To the extent that increased ideological social identity among these groups leads to greater
inter-group bias in behavior and attitudes, as the SIT literature would predict, this finding might help to explain
polarized attitudes and voting preferences within parties, particularly among conservatives and moderates of the
Republican Party, and their downstream effects on general elections and governance. Specifically, as ideological
divisions within the party become more salient, ideological social identity and its attendant effects become more
pronounced among ideologues as well as moderates. Since ideologues typically dominate primary electorates,
however, the end result is likely to be decreased support for moderate candidates and policies and increased support
for more ideological candidates and policies, thus leading to greater polarization within and later between the
parties. Given recent debates among scholars over the extent and causes of mass polarization (see, for example,
Abramowitz 2010; Fiorina and Abrams 2008), this relationship is well worth exploring in future research.
The effects of new media exposure also vary across ideological groups: cable news exposure is a
significant and positive predictor of conservative and moderate social identity only, while blog exposure is a
significant and positive predictor of liberal social identity only. A possible explanation for the discrepancy between
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Additional ANOVA tests confirm that ISI does not vary significantly across education levels, when measuring

education across its full range or as a median-split dichotomous variable.
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liberals and conservatives is that the former rely more upon blogs, such as the Daily Kos and Firedoglake, for
ideological content while the latter rely more upon cable news programs, such as Fox News’ Hannity and The
O’Reilly Factor, for ideological content. Again, the explanation for this discrepancy is a worthy topic for further
research. Also, it is worth noting that the only traditional news source to reach statistical significance in these
models, local television news, is negatively associated with moderate social identity. The explanation for this
finding is not immediately clear; perhaps the relative lack of ideological salience in local news coverage depresses
social identity for moderates who use it as their primary news source.
Among the other variables included in these models, the folded ideological self-placement scale is a
statistically significant and positive predictor of conservative and liberal social identity, 19 while the folded party
identification scale is a statistically significant and positive predictor of liberal and moderate social identity but only
a marginal and positive predictor of conservative social identity. The only other variable to reach conventional
levels of statistical significance in any of these models is education, which positively predicts liberal social identity.
For reasons detailed above, this is a particularly interesting finding. All other tests indicate that a high level of
education, and by proxy political sophistication, does not influence the strength of an ideological social identity.
However, for liberals it is relevant; more educated, or sophisticated, liberals tend to feel a greater sense of
psychological attachment to their ideological in-group. Absent further research, I can only speculate as to why this
is the case. A plausible explanation is that the one-sided and negative nature of social messages concerning the
liberal label, including elite ideological discourse and extra-political connotations, discourages strong and positive
attachment to that label except or less so among those individuals who possess sufficient political sophistication to
evaluate the liberal in-group based upon an advanced understanding of shared policy preferences and values. Once
more, further research would be useful in developing a more concrete explanation for this finding.
Having analyzed the validity, prevalence, and causes for variation in ideological social identity, the final
objective of this analysis is to evaluate its impact on political behavior. To do so, in accordance with the hypothesis
described above, I estimate two logistic regression models testing the interaction effect of ideological social identity
and ideological self-placement on vote choice in a hypothetical U.S. Senate election, described to participants in the
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Folded ideological self-placement is excluded from the moderate social identity model, since moderate identifiers

inhabit a single position on the scale and this precludes variation.
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experimental general election condition, and in the 2008 presidential election. The results of the hypothetical vote
choice model are presented in the first column of Table 2, and the results of the presidential vote choice model are
presented in the second column.
[Table 2 here]
Several variables in Table 2 reach conventional levels of statistical significance, including party
identification and education, in both models; age, in the experimental vote choice model; and gender and race, in the
presidential vote choice model. Following conventional methodological precedent, I do not substantively interpret
the coefficients and significance levels of the lower-order interaction variables or the interaction term since it
comprises two continuous variables (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Braumoeller 2004). Instead, I use
graphs of the interaction effect to evaluate it.20
Figures 2 and 3 plot the marginal effect of ideological self-placement on vote choice across levels of
ideological social identity. The solid line in each figure represents the marginal effect of self-placement on vote
choice in that election, as a participant’s ISI increases, and the dashed lines represent the upper and lower 95%
confidence intervals for the marginal effect. Ideological self-placement’s effect on vote choice is statistically
significant at any point on the ideological social identity scale that the 95% confidence intervals do not include a
value of zero.
[Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 shows that the marginal effect of ideological self-placement on vote choice is statistically
significant only at or above the midpoint of the ideological social identity scale (four), in the hypothetical Senate
election. Thus, for participants with a weak psychological attachment to their ideological in-group, self-placement
on the ideological scale does not significantly influence vote choice in this election. However, for participants with
a moderate to strong ISI, a majority of the survey experiment sample, self-placement does significantly influence
vote choice. These results provide initial support for the hypothesized interaction effect; ideological self-placement
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Likelihood ratio tests provide an additional indicator of ideological social identity’s empirical contribution. These

tests confirm that the addition of the ISI and interaction variables significantly improves model fit, both in the
hypothetical Senate vote choice model and in the 2008 presidential vote choice model, at the 0.05 confidence level.
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influences vote choice, but only insofar as an individual also feels at least moderate psychological attachment to the
ideological in-group.
[Figure 3 here]
Figure 3 provides additional support for the hypothesized interaction effect, this time using data from an
actual election. The marginal effect of ideological self-placement on vote choice in the 2008 presidential election
becomes statistically significant starting at a score of 2.5 on the ISI scale. Thus, self-placement has no discernible
effect on vote choice for participants with very weak psychological attachment to an ideological in-group, while it
does have a significant effect for participants with moderately weak to very strong ISI.
For a more precise estimation of the interaction effect, in Table 3 I present the predicted probabilities of
voting for the Democratic candidate in the 2008 presidential election and the experimental general election. For
both models, I predict the probability of voting for a given candidate at each category of ideological self-placement,
and at the neutral and maximum values of ideological social identity. When calculating predicted probabilities, all
variables are held at their mean or modal values except for ideological self-placement, ISI, and the interaction term.
[Table 3 here]
In both elections, the predicted probability of voting for a Democratic candidate changes in the expected
direction when moving from the midpoint to the maximum of the ISI scale and holding self-placement constant.
The predicted probability of voting for the Democratic candidate increases as ISI becomes stronger for very liberal,
liberal, and slightly liberal participants, excepting only slightly liberal participants in the 2008 presidential election.
Likewise, the predicted probability of voting for the Democratic candidate decreases as ISI becomes stronger for
very conservative, conservative, and slightly conservative participants, in both elections.
The pattern of change in predicted probabilities varies substantially between the two vote choice models,
with conservatives showing greater change across ISI values in the presidential election and liberals showing
slightly greater change across ISI values in the hypothetical Senate election. Also, the change in predicted
probabilities for liberals is far greater in the experimental general election than in the presidential election, while it
differs minimally for conservatives between the two elections. Barack Obama’s advantage in the 2008 election
might help to explain these discrepancies; liberals at all levels of ideological extremity and ideological social
identity were especially likely to vote for the Democratic candidate under unusually favorable electoral conditions,
while conservatives were more susceptible to variation given unfavorable electoral conditions and a Republican
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nominee oft-maligned for ideological unorthodoxy. In any case, the essential conclusion from both models is the
same: ideological self-placement’s effect on vote choice is not statistically significant when ideological social
identity is weak, and it becomes stronger as ideological social identity also becomes stronger. As expected, these
two distinct but related components of ideological identification reinforce one another, motivating more
ideologically consistent behavior as extremity increases.
To explain this relationship more clearly, I would argue that ideological social identity represents an
additional motivation not to defect from an ideological in-group and, in this case, support the out-group’s candidate.
An individual who is, for example, very conservative is unlikely to vote for an out-group candidate on the basis of
symbolic preference alone. However, when tempted the individual is less likely to actually defect if he or she feels a
strong sense of psychological attachment to the ideological in-group. To do so would not only go against in-group
interests that reflect upon self-evaluation, but it would be a violation of group norms that jeopardizes a valued ingroup membership and thus risks the significant psychological discomfort of destabilizing the self-concept. The
psychological incentive to engage in ideologically consistent behavior therefore weighs more heavily on individuals
with a strong, versus weak or nonexistent, ideological social identity.
Such an explanation of ideology’s impact on political behavior has not been previously established in the
symbolic ideology literature, primarily due to its reliance upon ideological self-placement as a measure of the central
concept. Indeed, the symbolic ideology literature, to date, has not adequately addressed the conceptual and
empirical shortcomings of measuring ideological in-group attachment through ideological self-placement. The
fundamental contribution of this article is to develop a credible, direct measure of ideological in-group attachment
and through its empirical application clarify the conditional nature of ideological self-identification’s impact on vote
choice, with potential expansion to other political behavior and attitudes.

Discussion
The results of this analysis underscore ideological social identity’s theoretical and empirical potential to
expand scholars’ understanding of ideological identification, in general, and symbolic ideology, in particular. The
ISI scale is derived from a valid and reliable measure of social identity used prominently within the SIT literature,
and evidence indicates that it is empirically distinct from the ideological self-placement scale that is standard within
symbolic ideology research. According to data obtained from a nationally representative survey experiment sample,
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ideological social identity is common within the American public; in fact, the mean ISI score among ideological
identifiers significantly exceeds the scale’s neutral point, and nearly one-third of participants at least slightly agree
with statements tapping psychological attachment to an ideological in-group.
This analysis also identifies who is most likely to hold a strong ideological social identity, and when those
identities are strengthened by environmental stimuli. Comparing across ideological groups, ISI is strongest among
conservatives and weakest among moderates. Feelings of psychological attachment to an ideological in-group are
not, however, exclusive to conservatives; liberals and conservatives, on average, score significantly higher than the
neutral point on the ISI scale. ISI also is not exclusive to sophisticates; education does not significantly predict the
strength of ideological social identity, in general, although it is significantly and positively related to liberal social
identity. I also find evidence that ISI is responsive to environmental stimuli that increase the salience of ideological
concepts. In general, participants who read experimental stimuli describing a hypothetical general election or party
primary scored significantly higher on the ISI scale, and about equally so between conditions, although this effect is
not found among liberal identifiers. The effect of party primaries on ideological social identity, for moderates and
conservatives, potentially has significant implications for scholars’ understanding of partisan polarization, as it may
help to explain moderates’ struggles to win party nominations and subsequent office; to the extent that primaries
stimulate increased ISI, ideological majorities are more likely to view moderates within their party as an out-group
and discriminate accordingly. Participants who frequently use “new media” news sources, such as cable television
news and internet blogs, score significantly higher on the ISI scale as well; exposure to cable news is associated with
increased conservative social identity, and exposure to blogs is associated with increased liberal social identity.
Finally, ideological social identity has a meaningful impact on vote choice and in a way that has significant
implications for the symbolic ideology literature. Whereas symbolic ideology studies routinely test the direct effects
of ideological self-placement on political attitudes and behavior, an interaction of self-placement with the ISI scale
shows evidence of a conditioning effect. Specifically, self-placement’s effects on vote choice are limited to
participants who feel at least a moderate degree of psychological attachment to their ideological in-group, and the
effects of self-placement increase as ideological social identity increases. The value of this empirical finding is not
to challenge the utility of the ideological self-placement scale or to recommend its replacement as a measure of
symbolic ideology, but to identify the conditions under which self-placement’s effects are limited or strengthened by
other aspects of ideological identification. Also, from a methodological standpoint, this analysis underscores the
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potential for, and value of, developing more direct measures of ideological in-group attachment than the selfplacement scale that is standard in symbolic ideology research. These contributions have significant potential to
improve scholars’ understanding and measurement of symbolic ideology and its behavioral significance. To further
understand the nature and significance of ideological social identity, future analyses should also include measures of
operational ideology, such as issue preferences, in their predictive models. Data limitations preclude such an
analysis in this article. However, if it were carried out, I would expect to find that the effects of ISI are robust to the
inclusion of operational ideology measures; the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of this article provide no
basis for expecting otherwise.21
Most importantly, ideological social identity represents a valuable opportunity for the theoretical extension
of symbolic ideology research. Social Identity Theory and symbolic ideology share many commonalities, in
particular their emphasis on the interaction between internal categorization and external group cues. Indeed, a
number of symbolic ideology scholars have invoked the language and theoretical assumptions of SIT to explain the
nature of ideological identification. To this point, though, the symbolic ideology literature’s incorporation of Social
Identity Theory has been underdeveloped and implicit more so than explicit. By directly measuring ideological
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To provide some initial insight into this relationship, in separate analyses of ANES data I created an approximate

measure of ISI by calculating the difference between liberal or conservative respondents’ feeling thermometer
ratings of their ideological in-group and out-group, such that a higher relative rating of the in-group indicates a
higher level of ISI. It is worth noting that Iyengar et al. (2012) use a parallel strategy to measure partisan affective
polarization (see Figure 3 and Table 3-5), a concept framed explicitly in terms of Social Identity Theory. Logistic
regression models predicting vote choice in the 1984-2008 presidential elections yield results remarkably similar to
those presented in this analysis and consistent across elections; even when controlling on five operational ideology
measures (government spending and services; health care; abortion; defense spending; government aid to AfricanAmericans), as well as relevant political and demographic variables, the marginal effect of ideological selfplacement on presidential vote choice is statistically significant but only for respondents with at least a moderately
strong (approximated) ISI, and its effects become stronger as ISI become stronger. One or more of the five
operational ideology measures is also statistically significant in each vote choice model, attesting to the at least
somewhat independent effects of these operational and symbolic ideology measures.
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identification as a social identity, as well as analyzing its causes and behavioral effects, this article represents a first
step toward more fully exploiting the theoretical and empirical potential of Social Identity Theory in order to
improve scholars’ understanding of ideological identification, in general, and symbolic ideology, in particular.
To further this argument, consider the implications of Self-Categorization Theory (Turner 1985; Turner et
al. 1987). SCT is an adaptation of Social Identity Theory that distinguishes itself, in part, by the assumption that
individuals subjectively evaluate in-groups and out-groups in comparison to the perceived prototype of a
superordinate category to which both groups belong. Thus, inter-group discrimination occurs when individuals
perceive a relevant out-group as deviating from the norms and values of the superordinate group also encompassing
the individual’s in-group. If the in-group and out-group are not perceived as belonging to a common superordinate
group, or if the out-group is perceived to be more relatively prototypical of the superordinate group than the
individual’s in-group, social discrimination is unlikely to occur.
This theory has significant implications for understanding, among other things, intra-party ideological
divisions and their effects on collective action within a party. After all, party primaries often play out as contests
between candidates representing opposing ideological factions, both of which struggle not just for the nomination
but to define the party’s image and expressed principles. Once the nomination is decided, party leaders and the
nominee in particular try desperately to heal factional wounds and unite the party to achieve victory in the coming
general election, as Mitt Romney did in the 2012 presidential election and John McCain did in the 2008 presidential
election. But, as Romney and McCain both found out, ideological opponents often resist – if not through outright
defection than by withholding the fruits of enthusiastic support.
Self-Categorization Theory is potentially relevant to understanding this process. For instance, SCT would
suggest that the most effective way for party leaders to reduce social discrimination against members of the
victorious intra-party ideological faction – such as withholding means of support or actively promoting defection –
is to redefine the losing faction’s superordinate category, from one that excludes the nominee to one that includes
the nominee. The candidate could do so by engaging in divisive partisan rhetoric that raises the salience of interparty differences, or by selecting a vice presidential nominee from the losing ideological faction so that its
supporters will perceive the party as mutually inclusive. Also, social identity could be helpful in understanding
whether, when, and to what degree members of competing intra-party ideological factions agree to reconcile past
differences and unite for collective action. I would suspect that ideological social identity negatively predicts
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reconciliation for members of the losing ideological faction, who fear strengthening the out-group through electoral
success, and positively predicts reconciliation for members of the winning ideological faction, who hope to
strengthen the in-group through electoral success.
Another opportunity for theoretical advancement comes from Mummendey and Wenzel’s (1999) In-Group
Projection Model. The IPM posits, in part, that individuals project the characteristics of their subgroup onto the
superordinate in-group, and therefore view fellow subgroup members as prototypical of the superordinate group and
members of opposing subgroups as deviant. The IPM could be helpful in understanding, among other things,
evaluations of candidate ideology. It is not uncommon for individuals to inaccurately project their ideological
identification onto a favored candidate (see, for example, Carmines and Berkman 1994), or for popular candidates to
be perceived by members of different ideological groups as a member of their in-group. If the IPM is relevant to
understanding such phenomena, it could be that mischaracterizations of a candidate’s ideology are less the product
of ignorance or a lack of ideological sophistication than a psychological motivation to project an ideological
subgroup identity onto the leader of a partisan superordinate group.
These are but two examples of how a more explicit and thorough integration of Social Identity Theory
stands to enrich scholars’ understanding of ideological identification, and particularly symbolic ideology. More
direct evidence comes from the results of this analysis, which indicate the credibility and relevance of a social
identity approach to ideology.

26

Appendix: Survey Experiment Stimuli
General Election Stimulus
Suppose an election is being held to determine your state’s next U.S. Senator, and you are a voter in this
election. Two candidates, one Democrat (Republican) and one Republican (Democrat), are competing to become
U.S. Senator.
Bill Reese is the Democratic (Republican) candidate in this race. Reese’s campaign has focused on a
number of issues where he says Republicans (Democrats) have led the nation astray recently by ignoring alternative
political views. In order to succeed now and in the future, Reese says the nation must begin to look to Democrats
(Republicans) for new ideas. A win by Reese would increase Democrats’ (Republicans’) power in the U.S.
government, and many people would view it as an indication that voters, at the state and national level, are shifting
in favor of Democrats’ (Republicans’) positions on the most important issues of the day.
Peter Keaton is the Republican (Democratic) candidate in this race. Keaton’s campaign says it is the
policies supported by Democrats (Republicans) that have led the nation astray from its core principles in recent
years. Keaton says that Republicans (Democrats) must be given the opportunity to lead once again if the nation is to
succeed today and in the years to come. Keaton’s victory in this election would strengthen Republicans’
(Democrats’) ability to shape U.S. government policy, while also proving, in the eyes of many, that the people now
favor the Republican (Democratic) Party’s approach to resolving the many important challenges faced by voters in
this state and throughout the nation.
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Party Primary Stimulus
Suppose a Republican (Democratic) Party primary is being held in your state to determine the Republican
(Democratic) nominee for an upcoming U.S. Senate race, and you are a voter in this primary. Two candidates are
competing to become the Republican (Democratic) Party’s nominee.
Bill Reese is viewed as the ideological moderate in this race. Reese’s campaign has focused on a number
of issues where he says conservative Republicans (liberal Democrats) have led the party astray recently by ignoring
alternative ideological views. In order to succeed now and in the future, Reese says the party must begin to reach
out to moderate and liberal Republicans (conservative Democrats) for new ideas. A win by Reese would increase
moderates’ power in the state party, and many people would view it as an indication that the Republican
(Democratic) Party, at the state and national level, is shifting in favor of ideological moderates’ positions on the
most important issues of the day.
Peter Keaton is viewed as the ideological conservative (liberal) in this race. Keaton’s campaign says it is
the policies supported by moderate and liberal Republicans (conservative Democrats) that have led the party astray
from its conservative (liberal) principles in recent years. Keaton says that conservative Republicans (liberal
Democrats) must be given the opportunity to lead once again if the party is to win this and other upcoming elections.
Keaton’s victory in this primary would strengthen conservatives’ (liberals’) ability to shape party policy, while also
proving, in the eyes of many, that the Republican (Democratic) Party now favors an ideologically conservative
(liberal) approach to resolving the many important challenges faced by voters in this state and throughout the nation.
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Tables
Parameter
Gen. Election Conditiona
Party Primary Conditiona
Idg. Self-Placement (Folded)
Party Identification (Folded)
Age
Education
Race (White)
Gender (Female)
Religiosity
Household Income
News Source: Local TV
News Source: Network TV
News Source: Cable TV
News Source: Radio
News Source: Newspaper
News Source: Blogs
Constant

Aggregate ISI
0.293*
(0.085)
0.277*
(0.085)
0.260*
(0.038)
0.178*
(0.038)
0.005*
(0.002)
0.020
(0.019)
0.140
(0.083)
-0.147*
(0.071)
0.012
(0.020)
-0.007
(0.009)
-0.033
(0.033)
0.009
(0.030)
0.079*
(0.025)
0.030
(0.022)
-0.020
(0.022)
0.073*
(0.026)
2.856
(0.199)

Conservative ISI
0.407*
(0.139)
0.304*
(0.136)
0.542*
(0.096)
0.103
(0.060)
0.007
(0.004)
0.013
(0.031)
0.215
(0.155)
-0.164
(0.119)
0.027
(0.033)
0.013
(0.015)
0.092
(0.052)
-0.065
(0.046)
0.114*
(0.039)
0.001
(0.034)
-0.065
(0.035)
0.027
(0.040)
2.040
(0.382)

Adjusted R-Squared
0.142
0.158
N
1032
426
Table 1: Predictors of the Strength of Ideological Social Identity

Liberal ISI
0.079
(0.186)
0.134
(0.185)
0.252*
(0.126)
0.225*
(0.088)
0.004
(0.005)
0.079*
(0.040)
0.153
(0.169)
-0.273
(0.154)
-0.052
(0.047)
-0.026
(0.019)
-0.039
(0.079)
0.091
(0.069)
-0.038
(0.060)
0.005
(0.047)
-0.015
(0.048)
0.149*
(0.054)
2.825
(0.508)

Moderate ISI
0.276*
(0.131)
0.339*
(0.135)
0.215*
(0.062)
0.001
(0.004)
0.009
(0.030)
-0.009
(0.125)
-0.022
(0.113)
0.004
(0.033)
-0.015
(0.015)
-0.154*
(0.051)
0.094
(0.049)
0.093*
(0.042)
0.034
(0.036)
0.046
(0.038)
0.042
(0.045)
3.307
(0.302)

0.107
244

0.104
362

Ideological social identity (ISI) scores represent a participant’s average level of agreement, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree) scale, with the following items: “When someone praises [political liberals/ conservatives/ moderates], it
feels to me like a personal compliment;” “[Political liberals’/ conservatives’/ moderates’] successes are my successes.”
Participants completed these measures for their ideological group only.
ISI scores constitute the dependent variable in each model. All participants are included in Column 1’s model. The
models presented in Columns 2, 3, and 4 include only conservatives, liberals, and moderates, respectively.
aParticipants

were randomly assigned to one of three electoral conditions, varying exposure to hypothetical electoral
competition. The excluded category in this analysis is control group participants, who received no stimulus.
Entries are linear regression coefficients, standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at 0.05.
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Parameter
Candidate Order
Age
Education
Race (White)
Gender (Female)
Religiosity
Household Income
Party Identification
Partisan Social Identity
Ideological Self-Placement
Ideological Social Identity
ISI * Self-Placement
Constant

Vote Choice:
Hypothetical Senate Election
-0.214
(0.395)
0.028*
(0.012)
0.261*
(0.087)
0.186
(0.493)
-0.129
(0.417)
-0.060
(0.108)
-0.061
(0.054)
-0.770*
(0.134)
0.251
(0.183)
0.800
(0.546)
0.982
(0.538)
-0.301*
(0.131)
-2.769
(2.541)

N
317
Log-Likelihood
-131.230
Table 2: Predictors of Vote Choice in Hypothetical and Actual Elections.

Vote Choice:
2008 Presidential Election
-0.004
(0.010)
0.220*
(0.090)
-1.275*
(0.383)
0.597*
(0.284)
-0.105
(0.096)
-0.054
(0.045)
-0.823*
(0.086)
-0.062
(0.157)
-0.292
(0.674)
0.215
(0.779)
-0.085
(0.160)
4.487
(2.802)
763
-222.806

The dependent variable in each model is coded 1 for Democratic vote choice, 0 for Republican vote choice, and
missing otherwise. The model presented in Column 1 predicts vote choice among participants randomly
assigned to an experimental condition describing a hypothetical U.S. Senate election between Democratic and
Republican candidates. The model presented in Column 2 predicts vote choice in the 2008 U.S. presidential
election, among all participants who reported voting for Barack Obama or John McCain in that election.
Participants were randomly assigned to an experimental stimulus describing the Republican candidate before
the Democratic candidate (coded 1), or the Democratic candidate before the Republican candidate (coded 0).
a

Entries are logistic regression coefficients, standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at 0.05.
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ISI = 4
(Neutral)

ISI = 7
(Maximum)

Difference

Very Liberal

89.1%

92.4%

3.3%

Liberal

81.3%

83.3%

2.0%

Slightly Liberal

69.9%

67.4%

-2.5%

Moderate

55.2%

46.0%

-9.2%

Slightly Conservative

39.6%

26.0%

-13.6%

Conservative

25.9%

12.7%

-13.2%

Very Conservative

15.7%

5.7%

-10.0%

Very Liberal

68.5%

94.4%

25.9%

Liberal

59.1%

81.9%

22.8%

Slightly Liberal

49.1%

55.0%

5.9%

Moderate

39.1%

24.8%

-14.3%

Slightly Conservative

30.0%

8.2%

-21.8%

Conservative

22.2%

2.4%

-19.8%

Ideological Self-Placement
2008 Presidential Election

Hypothetical Senate Election

Very Conservative
16.0%
0.7%
-15.3%
Table 3: Predicted Probabilities of Democratic Vote Choice, by Ideological Self-Placement and Strength of
Ideological Social Identity
Predicted probabilities are based upon results from the logistic regression models presented in Table 2,
which predict vote choice among all participants who reported voting for Barack Obama or John McCain
in the 2008 presidential election (top) and among all participants assigned to an experimental condition
describing a hypothetical U.S. Senate election between Democratic and Republican candidates (bottom).
The dependent variable in each model is coded 1 for Democratic vote choice, 0 for Republican vote
choice, and missing otherwise.
When calculating predicted probabilities, all variables are held at their mean or modal values, except for
ideological self-placement and ideological social identity (ISI). Ideological social identity scores represent
a participant’s average level of agreement, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale, with the
following items: “When someone praises [political liberals/ conservatives/ moderates], it feels to me like a
personal compliment;” “[Political liberals’/ conservatives’/ moderates’] successes are my successes.”
Participants completed these measures for their ideological group only.
Column 1 presents the predicted probability of Democratic vote choice, across ideological self-placement,
for participants who score at the neutral point of the ISI scale (4). Column 2 presents predicted
probabilities of the same, for participants who score at the highest point on the ISI scale (7). Column 3
quantifies the difference in predicted probability of Democratic vote choice when moving from the
midpoint to the maximum on the ISI scale.
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Figure 1: Kernel Density Plot of Ideological Social Identity Scores, Aggregated and by Ideological Group.
Ideological social identity scores represent a participant’s average level of agreement, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree) scale, with the following items: “When someone praises [political liberals/ conservatives/
moderates], it feels to me like a personal compliment;” “[Political liberals’/ conservatives’ / moderates’] successes
are my successes.” Participants completed these measures for their ideological group only.
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Figure 2: Interaction Effect of Ideological Self-Placement and Ideological Social Identity on Vote Choice in a
Hypothetical U.S. Senate Election
The above figure is based upon logistic regression model results presented in the first column of Table 2, predicting
vote choice among participants assigned to an experimental condition describing a hypothetical U.S. Senate
election between Democratic and Republican candidates. The dependent variable is coded one for Democratic vote
choice, zero for Republican vote choice, and missing otherwise.
To evaluate a hypothesized interaction effect, Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of ideological self-placement on
vote choice across levels of ideological social identity (ISI). The solid line in this figure represents the marginal
effect of self-placement on vote choice in the hypothetical Senate election, as a participant’s ISI increases, and the
dashed lines represent the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals for the marginal effect. Ideological selfplacement’s effect on vote choice is statistically significant at any point on the ideological social identity scale that
the 95% confidence intervals do not include a value of zero.
ISI scores represent a participant’s average level of agreement, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
scale, with the following items: “When someone praises [political liberals/ conservatives/ moderates], it feels to me
like a personal compliment;” “[Political liberals’/ conservatives’ / moderates’] successes are my successes.”
Participants completed these measures for their ideological group only.
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Figure 3: Interaction Effect of Ideological Self-Placement and Ideological Social Identity on Vote Choice in the
2008 U.S. Presidential Election
The above figure is based upon logistic regression model results presented in the second column of Table 2,
predicting vote choice among all participants who reported voting for Barack Obama or John McCain in the 2008
presidential election. The dependent variable is coded one for Democratic vote choice, zero for Republican vote
choice, and missing otherwise.
To evaluate a hypothesized interaction effect, Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of ideological self-placement on
vote choice across levels of ideological social identity (ISI). The solid line in this figure represents the marginal
effect of self-placement on vote choice in the 2008 presidential election, as a participant’s ISI increases, and the
dashed lines represent the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals for the marginal effect. Ideological selfplacement’s effect on vote choice is statistically significant at any point on the ideological social identity scale that
the 95% confidence intervals do not include a value of zero.
ISI scores represent a participant’s average level of agreement, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
scale, with the following items: “When someone praises [political liberals/ conservatives/ moderates], it feels to me
like a personal compliment;” “[Political liberals’/ conservatives’ / moderates’] successes are my successes.”
Participants completed these measures for their ideological group only.
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